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FAITH AND THE LAWYER'S PRACTICE
RUSSELL G. PEARCEt
I am going to start with two texts relating to faith and the
lawyer's practice. The first is an opinion of the Tennessee Board
of Professional Responsibilities, which Howard Lesnick has
written so eloquently about.'
A lawyer who believed that abortion was murder was
appointed by the court to represent teenage girls who were
seeking consent for abortions by seeking court waivers of
parental consent for abortions. 2 He asked the Tennessee Board
for advice on a number of issues including- one, could he advise
his clients about alternatives to abortion; and two, could he
3
decline to accept the appointment for religious reasons.
Although the decision relating to the appointment was up to the
court and not the board, in a rather lengthy opinion, the
committee responded that to give such advice or to decline such
4
an appointment would be unprofessional.
In the second text, the Maggid of Mezeritch went to study
with the Baal Shem Toy, who was the founder of the Hasidic
movement on Judaism. 5 The Baal Shem Tov gave the Maggid a
book and asked the Maggid to read to him.6 The Maggid read but
the Baal Shem Toy said that that was not satisfactory. 7 The
Maggid responded that he got all the words right.8 What was
the problem? The Baal Shem Toy told him he knew how to

t J.D., Yale Law School; B.A., Yale College. Professor of Law and Co-Director of
the Louis Stein Center for Ethics and Law at Fordhaam University School of Law.
I See Howard Lesnick, The
FORDHA i L. REV. 1469 (1998).

Religious Lawyer in a Pluralist Society, 66

See id. at 1469.
3 See id.
4 See id. at 1469-70.
2

5 See ELIE WIESEL, SOULS ON FIRE: PORTRAITS AND LEGENDS OF HASIDIC

MASTERS 54-55 (Marion Wiesel trans., 1972).
6 See id. at 55.
7 See id.
8 See id.

ST. JOHN'S LAW REVIEW

[Vol.75:277

decipher the signs, but his reading lacked soul. 9 Whereupon, the
Baal Shem Tov picked up the book and began to read and
according to the Maggid, the room filled with light and it was as
if he was standing in Sinai again. 10
If there is a religious way to read, is there a religious way to
be a lawyer? More and more lawyers, judges and scholars are
answering yes to that question. We heard earlier from Cardinal
Bevilacqua about the history of the Religious Lawyering
Movement, which blossomed in the 1990s. There was writing
about the law and religion before that time." We can date
religious lawyering as a body of work in mainstream legal
literature, as Cardinal Bevilacqua did, to the work of Professor
Thomas Shaffer in the 1980s. 12 Why did this movement take off
in the 1990s?
Before I answer that, I just want to say that as long as we
are talking about the movement, I do want to acknowledge the
contributions of Sam Levine 3 who has been affiliated or was
affiliated with this law school. He has made some of the most
important contributions to the Religious Lawyering Movement,
especially in the area of Jewish lawyering.
Again, what accounts for the growth of the Religious
Lawyering Movement? A renewed interest in religion across
society as a whole is one reason. Related to that, lawyers, like
others, are engaged in a search for meaning in their work. In
the past, many lawyers would have found this meaning in
professionalism, but during today's crisis of professionalism,
lawyers are unable to find a satisfactory way to reconcile their
personal aspirations with what they consider to be the harsh
realities of the marketplace.
The organized bar has been singularly unsuccessful in
9 See id.
10 See id. For further discussion of applying the concept of acting with soul to
the practice of law, see, Russell G. Pearce, The Jewish Lawyer's Question, 27 TEX.
TECH L. REV. 1259, 1267-70 (1996).
11 See generally Thomas L. Shaffer, The Practice Of Law As Moral Discourse, 55
NOTRE DAME LAWYER 231 (1979); Thomas L. Shaffer, A Lesson From Trollope for
Counselorsat Law, 35 WASH. & LEE L. REV. 727 (1978).
12 See THOMAS L. SHAFFER, ON BEING A CHRISTIAN AND A LAWYER: LAW FOR

THE INNOCENT (1981)
13 See Samuel J. Levine, The Broad Life of the Jewish Lawyer: Integrating
Spirituality, Scholarship and Profession, 27 TEX. TECH L. REV. 1199, 1210 (1996)

(discussing how religious faith and thought impacted the author's career, from law
school to his practice in criminal law).
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finding a way to encourage lawyers to meet their obligations to
the public good and to live a work life of high ethics. Under
these circumstances, increasing numbers of lawyers, who find
meaning in their faith, are exploring whether their faith offers a
source of meaning for their work.
As the Religious Lawyering Movement has grown and
matured, it has divided into different schools of thought. Today,
I am going to talk about the two approaches to the question of
professionalism. One school believes that religious lawyering
can exist with professionalism, and indeed can be mutually
supportive. The other believes that religious lawyering and
professionalism
are
inevitably
in
conflict
and
that
professionalism should be rejected.
Commentators in the first school make three kinds of
arguments. First, they argue that religious values reinforce
professional values. They look to particular professional duties,
like the obligation to provide pro bono service to the poor. They
find support for that obligation in the religious value in service

to the poor. They look to the professional notion of civility and
find religious understandings or demands that we treat each
other with respect.
Second, they argue religion and professionalism both
develop virtue and character.
Professor Timothy Floyd, for
example, argues that through the practice of law, a lawyer
applies and develops virtues that make the lawyer a better
professional and a better religious person. 14 He points to the
5
virtues of prudence, temperance, fortitude and justice.
Third, they argue that nothing in legal ethics prevents
lawyers from drawing on religious values. Professor Bruce
Green argues that legal ethics offer wide areas of discretion in
which lawyers can fill with whatever values they want. 16 These
include who to represent and whether to counsel a client morally
7
and how to counsel them.'
But what about the Tennessee opinion that I mentioned
earlier? I think that opinion underscores a failing of this school
14 See Timothy W. Floyd, The Practice of Law as a Vocation or Calling, 66

FORDHAM L. REV. 1405, 1415 (1998).
15 See id. at 1421-22.
16 See Bruce

A. Green, Lawyer Discipline: Conscientious Noncompliance,

Conscious Avoidance, and Prosecutorial Discretion, 66 FORDHAM L. REv. 1307,
1307-08 (1998).
17 See id. at 1309-12.
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of thought. I believe this school of thought has a lot of
superficial appeal. When you get beyond the surface of religion
and professionalism, you find, like the Tennessee Board, a
fundamental contradiction. Why does this contradiction exist?
As Professor Sanford Levinson has noted, professionalism
requires lawyers to exclude or, in his terms, "bleach out" the
8
contingent aspects of the self, including one's faith.'
Professionalism assumes that the actors in the legal system are
neutral and fungible.19 There should be no difference between a
male lawyer and a female lawyer, between a white lawyer and a
20
black lawyer, between a Christian, Jewish or Muslim lawyer.
In a system that aspires to equal justice under law the quality of
justice and the lawyering a person receives should not depend on
the religion of the lawyer.
Why would religious lawyers challenge professionalism?
Professor Allegretti has pointed out in his previous work that not
of all them would. 2 1 Some people, for religious reasons, would
totally separate religion from the secular world and others would
find fulfillment of their religious values in secular
professionalism. Many religious lawyers, however, would not.
Those who would separate religion from the secular world echo
the language of their own faith, such as the Baal Shem Tov's
advice to the Maggid of Mezeritch. Those who would agree with
Martin Buber recognize that we shall accomplish nothing at all if
we divide our world and our lives into two domains, one in which
God's command is paramount; the other governed exclusively by
the law of economics, politics and the simple self-assertion of the
group.

22

In a similar spirit, earlier today, Cardinal Bevilacqua urged
that lawyers place the judgment of God before the judgment of
their colleagues. Must you reject this rule of law to be this type
of religious lawyer? I think not. You need not reject the rule of
law but you must rethink it. We live in a time when many are
skeptical of claims of neutrality. When many believe that
lawyers and even judges are influenced by their race, gender,
18 Sanford Levinson, Identifying the Jewish Lawyer: Reflections on the
Constructionof ProfessionalIdentity, 14 CARDOZO L. REv. 1577, 1601 (1993).
19 See id. at 1578-79.
20 See id. at 1579.
21 See JOSEPH G. ALLEGRETTI, THE LAWYER'S CALLING (1996).
22 See MARTIN BUBER, ON JUDAISM 25-27 (Nahun N. Glatzer ed., 1967).
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politics and religion. Those of us who believe in the rule of law
may be better off if we forego obsolete notions of neutrality.
As Martha Minow has written, you cannot avoid trouble
through ignoring difference, nor can you find a solution in
neutrality.23 She instead suggests striving for impartiality 'by
admitting our partiality."24 We should seek to create community

by joining to explore the potential for the rule of law in light of
how we are all different, as well as, how we are all the same.
Professor David Thomas of Harvard Business School has
observed that organizational goals such as rule of law for
lawyers are best maximized when group identity differences are
openly acknowledged and managed. 25
So what is the future of the Religious Lawyering Movement?
As long as professionalism continues to fail to provide meaning
to most lawyers, interest in the Religious Lawyering Movement
will grow. As long as the Religious Lawyering Movement
continues to grow, it will increase the pressure on the
community of lawyers to find a new paradigm to replace
professionalism,
just
as
professionalism
superseded
republicanism in the late 1800s. When the new paradigm
arrives, it will make extraordinary demands on lawyers.
How much more challenging than the ideals of
professionalism are the three ideals Cardinal Bevilacqua
presented to us this morning? What an awesome challenge for
lawyers. Their work is fundamental to the foundation of the
world, the determination of truth, the administration of justice,
and the maintenance of peace.

23

See Martha Minow, The Supreme Court 1986 Term: Foreword: Justice

Engendered,101 HARV. L. REV. 10, 75 (1987).

See id.
See Russell G. Pearce, Jewish Lawyering in a Multicultural Society: A
Midrash on Levinson, 14 CARDOZO L. REV. 1613, 1636 (1993) (discussing Professor
24

25

Thomas' suggestion that "organizational goals ... are best maximized where
identity group differences are openly acknowledged and managed").
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